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Abstract 
This paper aims to suggest a new approach to Plato’s theory of being in 
Republic V and Sophist based on the notion of difference and the being of a 
copy. To understand Plato’s ontology in these two dialogues we are going 
to suggest a theory we call Pollachos Esti; a name we took from Aristotle’s 
pollachos legetai both to remind the similarities of the two structures and 
to reach a consistent view of Plato’s ontology. Based on this theory, when 
Plato says that something both is and is not, he is applying difference on 
being which is interpreted here as saying, borrowing Aristotle’s 
terminology, 'is is (esti) in different senses'. I hope this paper can show 
how Pollachos Esti can bring forth not only a new approach to Plato’s 
ontology in Sophist and Republic but also a different approach to being in 
general. 
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Introduction 
The Republic 476-477 has always been a matter of controversy mainly about 
two interwoven points. The first problem is the meaning of being here; that whether 
what he has in mind is a veridical, existential or propositional sense of being.
1
 The 
second problem is his distinction between the objects of knowledge and opinion 
which seems to lead, some believe, to the Two Worlds (TW) theory. The crucial 
point in Republic is that what is considered between knowledge (ἐπιστήμης) and 
ignorance (α ͗γνοιας), namely opinion, must have a different object that leads 
Socrates to draw the distinction of knowledge and opinion between their objects.
2
 
The problem of understanding being in the fifth book of the Republic is that 
when it is said that the Form of F is F but a particular participating in F, both is and is 
not F, it sounds too bizarre and unacceptable. It cannot be imaginable how a thing 
can be existent and non-existent at the same time. At the first sight, the only solution 
seems to be the degrees of existence which is called by Annas (1981, 197) a 'childish 
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fallacy' and a 'silly argument'. Kirwan (1974, 118) thinks that Republic V does not 
attribute 'any doctrine about existence' to Plato and Kahn (1966, 250) claims that the 
most fundamental value of einai when used alone (without predicate) is not "to exist" 
but "to be so", "to be the case" or "to be true". The problems of understanding being 
in Republic and Sophist besides the difficulties of the existential reading led scholars 
to the other senses of being, mostly related to the well-known Aristotelian 
distinctions between different senses of being.
3
 In the predicative reading, Annas, for 
example, refers this difference to the qualified and unqualified application. Whereas 
the Form of F is unqualifiedly F, a particular instance of F can be F only qualifiedly 
(1981, 221). Vlastos’ well-known substitution of 'degrees of reality' for 'degrees of 
being/existence' must be categorized as a predicative reading. Kahn thinks that the 
basic sense of being for Plato is 'something like propositional structure, involving 
both predication and truth claims, together with existence for the subject of 
predication' (2013, 96). Believing that the complete-incomplete distinction 
terminology is misleading about Plato, he thinks that semantic functions are only 
second-order uses of the verb and it is the predicative or incomplete function which 
is fundamental. Suggesting a veridical reading,
4
 Fine (2003, 70 ff) thinks that while 
both existential and predicative readings separate the objects of knowledge and 
belief, it is only her reading which does not force such separation of the objects and 
thus does not imply TW.
5
 Stokes (1998, 266) thinks that though Fine is right saying 
that Plato does not endorse TW in book V, she is wrong in rejecting existential in 
favor of the veridical reading. The reception of existential reading can be seen more 
obviously in Calvert who thinks, in agreement with Runciman, that 'it would be safer 
to say that Plato’s gradational ontology is probably not entirely free from degrees of 
existence' (1970, 46). 
 
1. Being, Not-Being and Difference 
The three dialogues where the notion of "difference" attaches to the notion of 
being, namely Parmenides II, Sophist and Timaeus,and specifically the first two we 
try to discuss here. In these dialogues, Plato is going to achieve a new and 
revolutionary understanding of being which is not anymore based on the notion of 
"same" as it was before in Greek ontology. It was his discovery, I think, that the 
notion of being in the Greek ontology is attached to the notion of the "same" and it is 
because of this attachment that there have always been many problems understanding 
being especially after Parmenides. That being has always been relying on the "same" 
can be found out from the way most of the Presocratics understood it. It was based 
on such a relationship between being and "same" that a later Ionian, Heraclitus of 
Ephesus, rejected Being by rejecting its sameness: unable to be the same, being 
cannot be being anymore but becoming. Heraclitus’ criticism of his predecessors’ 
understanding of being was due to his discovery that what they call being is not the 
same but different in every moment.
6
 The relation of being and sameness reaches to 
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its highest point in Parmenides.
7
 What Plato does in using the "difference" is nothing 
but the establishment of a creative relation between being and "difference". In this 
new relation, although he is in agreement with Heraclitus that being is not the same 
but different, he does not do it by use of becoming. He disagrees, on the other hand, 
with Parmenides that such a relation between being and difference leads to not being. 
At Parmenides 142b5-6 it is said that if One is, it is not possible for it to be 
without partaking (μετε ́χειν) of being (οὐσίας), which leads to the distinction of 
being and one: 
 
So there would be also the being of the one (ἡ οὐσία του ̑ ἑνὸς) which is not 
the same (ταὐτὸν) as the one. Otherwise, it wouldn’t be its being, nor the one 
would partake of it. (142b7-c1)
8
 
 
The fact that what is (ἔστι) signifies (σημαῖνον) is other (ἀλλο) than what 
One signifies (c4-5), is being taken as a reason for their distinction.
9
 The conclusion 
is that when we say 'one is', we speak of two different things, one partaking of the 
other (c5-7). Having repeated these arguments of the otherness of being and one at 
143a-b, Parmenides says that the cause of this otherness can be neither Being nor 
One but "difference": 
 
So if being is something different (ἕτερον) and one something different 
(ἕτερον), it is not by being one that the one is different from being nor by its 
being being that being is other than one, but they are different from each other 
(ἕτερα ἀλλήλων) by difference (τῷ ἑτερῳ) and otherness (ἄλλῳ). (143b3-6) 
 
The fifth hypothesis, 'one is not' (160b5ff.) is also linked with the notion of 
difference. When we say about two things, largeness and smallness, that they are not, 
it is clear that we are talking about not being of different (ἕτερον) things (160c2-4). 
When it is said that something is not, besides the fact that there must be knowledge 
of that thing, we can say that it entails also its difference: 'difference in kind pertains 
to it in addition to knowledge' (160d8). Parmenides explains the reason as such: 
 
For someone doesn’t speak of the difference in kind of the others when he says 
that the one is different from the others, but of that thing’s own difference in 
kind. (160e1-2) 
 
Although the theory of being as "difference" is not fulfilled yet, an exact look 
at what occurs in Sophist can make us sure that this was the launching step for 
"difference" to get its deserved role in Plato’s ontology. The notion of the 
"difference" is not yet well-functioned in Parmenides because we can see that being 
is still attached to the same: 
 
For that which is the same is being (ὄν γὰρ ἐστι τὸ ταὐτόν) (162d2-3). 
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The notion of difference in Sophist is the key element based on which a new 
understanding of being is presented and the problem of not being is somehow 
resolved. The friends of Forms, the Stranger says, are those who distinguish between 
being and becoming (248a7-8) and believe that we deal with the latter with our body 
and through perception while with the former, the real being (ὄντως οὐσίαν) with 
our soul and through reasoning (a10-11). Being is then bound with the "same" by 
adding: 
 
You say that being always stays the same and in the same state (ἣν ἀεὶ κατὰ 
ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχειν) but becoming varies from one time to another (δὲ 
ἄλλοτε ἄλλως). (248a12-13) 
 
That the theory of the relation of being and capacity (247d8f., 248c4-5) 
matches more with becoming than with being (248c7-9) must be rejected because 
being is also the subject of knowledge which is kind of doing something (248d-e). It 
does, however, confirm that 'both that which changes and also change have to be 
admitted as existing things (ὄντα) (249b2-3). I believe that this is what Socrates 
would incline to do at Theaetetus 180e-181a, that is, putting a fight between two 
parties of Parmenidean being and Heraclitean becoming and then escaping. The 
solution is that becoming is itself a kind of being and we ought to accept what 
changes as being. This is what must be done by a philosopher, namely, to refuse both 
the claim that 'everything is at rest' and that 'being changes in every way' and beg, 
like a child, for both and say being (τὸὄν) is both the unchanging and that which 
changes (249c10-d4). This kind of begging for both is obviously under the attack of 
contradiction (249e-250b). For both and each of rest and change similarly are 
(250a11-12) but it cannot be said either that both of them change or both of them 
rest, being must be considered as a third thing both of the rest and change associate 
with (250b7-10). The conclusion is that 'being is not both change and rest but 
different (ἕτερον) from them instead' (c3-4). The notion of difference helps Plato to 
take being departed from both rest and change because it was their sophisticated 
relation with being that made the opposition of being and becoming. Plato is now 
trying to separate being from rest and, thus, from "same" by "difference". Such a 
crucial change is great enough to need a 'fearless' decision (256d5-6). The possibility 
of being of not being is resulted (d11-12) comes as the answer to the question 'so it’s 
clear that change is not being and also is being (ἡ κίνησις ὄντως οὐκ ὄν ἐστι καὶ 
ὄν) since it partakes in being?' (d8-9). It is then by the notion of difference that 
becoming is considered as that which both is and is not. This coincidence of being 
and not being about change is apparently similar to Socrates’ paradoxical statement 
at Republic 477a about what both is and is not. 
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At Sophist 254d-e Plato singles out five most important kinds (or Forms!?) in 
which the same (ταὐτὸν) and difference (θάτερον) are regarded besides being, rest 
and change. They are, therefore, neither the same nor the difference but share in both 
(b3). Being (τὸ ὄν) cannot be the same also because if they 'do not signify distinct 
things' both change and rest will have the same label when we say they are (255b11-
c1). We have then four distinct kinds, being, change, rest and same, none of them is 
the other. The case of difference is more complicated. When the stranger wants to 
assess the relation of being and difference, he can say simply neither that they are 
distinct nor that they are not. He has to make an important distinction inside being to 
get able to draw the relation of being and difference: 
 
But I think you'll admit that some of the things that are (τῶν ὄντων) are said 
(λέγεσθαι) by themselves (αὐτὰ καθ’ αὑτά) but some [are said] always 
referring to (πρὸς) other things (ἄλλα) (255b12-13)  
 
The difference is always said referring to other things (τὸδέγ’ ἕτερον ἀεὶ 
πρὸς ἕτερον) (255d1). It pervades10 all kinds because each of them should be 
different from the others and is so due to the difference and not its own nature 
(253e3f.) After asserting that change is different from being and therefore both is and 
is not (256d), the difference is described as what makes all the other kinds not be, by 
making each different from being. Given that all of them are by being, this 
association of being and difference is the cause of their being and not-being at the 
same time, the issue that its version at RepublicV made all those controversies we 
discussed above: 
 
So in the case of change and all the kinds, not being necessarily is (Ἔστιν ἄρα 
ἐξ ἀναγκης τὸ μὴ ὄν). Τhat’s because as applied to all of them, the nature of 
the difference (ἡ θατέρον φύσις) makes each of them not be by making it 
different from being. And we’re going to be right if we say that all of them are 
not in the same way. And conversely [we’re also going to be right if we say] that 
they are because they partake in being. (Sophist 256d11-e3) 
 
Plato’s new construction of five distinct kinds and the role he gives to 
thedifference among them is aimed to resolve the old problem of understanding 
being which has always been annoying from the time of Heraclitus and Parmenides. 
Both the ontological status of becoming and that of not being were, in Plato’s mind, 
based on the absolute domination of the notion of the Same over being. Now, not 
only becoming is understandable as being but also not being which is not the 
contrary of being anymore but only different (ἕτερον) (257b3-4).  
Though I agree partly with Frede that the account of not being which is needed 
for false statements is more complicated than just saying, as Cropsey (1995, 101) 
says, that Plato is substituting 'X is not Y' with 'X is different from Y',
11
 I totally 
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disagree with him that when we say X is not beautiful, Plato could not have thought 
that it is not a matter of its being different from beautiful because 'it would be 
different from beauty even if it were beautiful by participation in beauty' (1992, 411). 
Conversely, as we will discuss, it is exactly the relation of the beautiful thing, X, and 
the beautiful itself, in which X shares that is to be solved by the notion of not being 
as difference. Though it is beautiful because of sharing in beauty, X is not beautiful 
because it is different from beautiful itself. What the difference is to do is to show 
how something can both be and not be the same thing.
12
 The difference is what 
makes one thing both be and not be a certain other thing. This equips the difference 
with the ability to explain a certain thing’s not-being when it is. Thanks to the notion 
of difference, it is now possible to explain not only not being but also the 
simultaneous being and not being of a thing: 'What we call
13
 "not-beautiful" is the 
thing that ἕτερόν ἐστιν from nothing other than του ̑ καλου ̑ φύσεως' (257d10-
11).
14
 The result is that not beautiful happens to be (συμβέβηκεν εἶναι) one single 
thing among kinds of beings (τι τῶν ὄντων τινὸς ἑνὸς γένους) and at the same 
time set over against one of the beings (πρός τι τῶν ὄντων αὖ πάλιν ἀντιτεθὲν) 
(257e2-4) and thus be something that happens to be not beautiful (εἶναί τις 
συμβαίνει τὸ μὴ καλόν); a being set over against being (ὄντος δὴ πρὸς ὄν 
ἀντίθεσις) (e6-7). Neither the beautiful is more a being (μα ̑λλον ... ἐστι τῶν 
ὄντων) nor not beautiful less (e9-10) and thus both the contraries similarly are 
(ὁμοίως εἶναι) (258a1). This conclusion, it is emphasized again (a7-9), owes to 
θατέρου φύσις now turned out as being. Therefore, each of the many things that 
are of the nature of the difference and set over each other in being (τῆς τοῦ ὄντος 
πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀντικειμένων ἀντίθεσις) is being as being itself is being (αὐτοῦ 
τοῦὄν τοςοὐσία ἐστιν) and not less. They are different from, and not the contrary 
of, each other (a11-b3). This is exactly τὸμὴὄν, the subject of the inquiry (b6-7).15 
Hence, not being has its own nature (b10) and is one εἶδοςamong the many things 
that are (b9-c3). 
Such far departing from Parmenides’ ontological principle is done on the basis 
of the nature of the difference. It was the discovery of such a notion that made the 
stranger brave enough to say that not being is each part of the nature of the difference 
that is set over against being (258d7-e3, cf. 260b7-8). That the relation of being and 
difference is difference is the key element of the new ontology. The difference is, 
only because of its sharing in being, but it is not that which it shares in but different 
from it (259a6-8).
16
 Not being is exactly based on this difference: ἕτερον δὲ τοῦ 
ὄντος ὄν ἔστι σαφέστατα ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι μὴ ὄν (a8-b1). 
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2. Difference and the Being of a Copy 
We discussed above that the sense of being of particulars in Republic V made 
so many debates that whether being is there used in an existential sense or not. 
Particulars in Republic are regarded as images in the allegories of Line and Cave. 
The being of an image/copy makes, thus, the same problem.  Plato’s analogy of 
original
17
-copy for the relation of Forms and their particulars in Republic has 
obviously a different attitude to being. The main question is that what is the 
ontological status of a copy in respect of its original? Are there two kinds of being, 
'real being' versus 'being' as Ketchum says (1980, 140) or only one kind? What is the 
difference of being in an original and its copy? Is it a matter of degrees of being or 
reality as some commentators have suggested? Is it a matter of being relational?  
By reducing the ontological issue to an epistemological one, Vlastos’ 
suggestion of degrees of reality in an article with the same name does neither, I think, 
pay attention to the problem nor resolve it. He agrees that Plato never speaks of 
"degrees" or "grades" of reality (1998, 219). What allows him to entitle it as such are 
some of Plato’s words in Republic18 as well as Plato’s words in some other 
dialogues
19
 (1998, 219). When Plato states that the Forms only can completely, 
purely or perfectly be real he means, Vlastos says, they are cognitively reliable 
(1998, 229); an obvious reduction of the issue to an epistemological one.
20
 He thinks 
that when in Republic we are being said that a particular’s being F is less pure than 
its Form, it is because it is not exclusively F, but it is and is not F and this being 
adulterated by contrary characters is the reason of our confused and uncertain 
understanding of it (1998, 222).  
Ketchum rightly criticizes Vlastos’ doctrine in its disparting from ontology 
thinking that 'to understand Plato’s talk of being as talk of reality is to obscure the 
close relation that exists between "being" and the verb "to be"'
21
 (1980, 213). He 
thinks, therefore, that οὐσία must be understοοd as being rather than reality, τὸὄν as 
"that which is" and not "that which is real" and … (ibid). His conclusion is that 
degrees of reality cannot interpret Plato correctly and we must accept degrees of 
being. Allen believes that a 'purely epistemic' reading of the passage in Republic is 
patently at odds with Plato’s text (1961, 325). He thinks that not only degrees of 
reality but also degrees of reality must be maintained (1998, 67). What Cooper 
suggests gets close to this paper’s solution: 
 
Plato does not I think wish to suggest that existence is a matter of degree in the 
way in which being pleasant or painful is a matter of degree. Rather there are 
different grades of ontological status.
22
 (1986, 241) 
 
A more ontological solution for the problem of understanding the being of a 
copy and its relation with the being of its original is suggested by the theory of copy 
as a relational entity. Based on this interpretation, 'the very being of a reflection is 
relational, wholly dependent upon what is other than itself: the original…' (Allen, 
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1998, 62). As relational entities, particulars have no independent ontological status; 
they are purely relational entities which derive their whole character and existence 
from Forms (ibid, 67). Although these relational entities are and have a kind of 
existence, we must also say that 'they do not have existence in the way that Forms, 
things which are fully real, do' (ibid). Allen (1961, 331) extends his theory to Phaedo 
where it is said that particulars are deficient (74d5-7, 75a2-3, 75b4-8), 'wish' to be 
like (74d10) or desire to be of its nature (75a2); an extension that, like F.C. white
23
 
(1977, 200), I cannot admit. He correctly states that Plato did not start out with a 
doctrine of particulars as images and semblances but come to such a view after 
Phaedo, or perhaps after Republic V (1977, 202). Though we may not agree with him 
about Republic V, if we have to consider its last pages also, we must agree with him 
that not only the ontology of Phaedo but also that of Republic II-V (except the last 
pages of the latter book) are somehow different from (but at the same time appealing 
to) the ontology of original-copy which should exclusively assign to Sophist, 
Timaeus and RepublicVI-VII besides the last pages of book V.
24
 
The answer to the problem of Plato’s sense of being in RepublicV can be 
reached only if we read Republic V based on and as following Sophist.
25
 We can find 
out his meaning of that which both is and is not only by the ontological status he 
assigns to a copy in Sophist. The kind of being of a copy in Sophist reveals as Plato’s 
key for the lock of the problem of not being. Let’s see how the ontological status of a 
copy is the critical point of Plato’s ontology. 
In the earlier pages of Sophist, we are still in the same situation about not 
being. To think that that which is not is is called a rash assumption (237a3-4) and 
Parmenides’ principle of the impossibility of being of not being is still at work (a8-
9). At 237c1-4, the problem of "not being" is noticed in a new way which shows 
some kinds of a more realistic position to the problem of not being.  Nevertheless, 
not being is still unthinkable, unsayable, unutterable and unformulable in speech 
(238c10). Soon after mentioning that it is difficult even to refuse not being (238d), 
the solution to the problem appears:  the being of a copy (εἴδωλον) (239d). A copy 
is, says Theaetetus, something that is made referring to a true thing (πρὸς 
τἀληθινὸν) but still is 'another such thing (ἕτεροντοιου ̑τον)' (240a8). 
Nevertheless, this 'another such thing' cannot be another such real or true thing. In 
answer to the question of the Stranger that if this 'another such thing' is the true thing 
(240a9), Theaetetus answers: οὐδαμῶς ἀληθινόν γε, ἀλλ’ ἐοικὸςμὲν (240b2). A 
copy’s being 'another such thing' does not mean another true thing but only a 
resemblance of it. Not only is not a copy another true thing besides the original, but it 
is the opposite of the true thing (b5) because only its original is the thing genuinely 
and being a copy is being the thing only untruly. The word ἐοικὸς is opposed to 
ὄντως ὄν in the next line (240b7): 'So you are saying that that which is like 
(ἐοικὸς) is not really that which is (οὐκ ὄντως [οὐκ] ὄν)'. But still a copy 'is in a 
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way (ἔστι γε μήν πως)' (b9). While it is not really what it is its resemblance, it has 
its own being and reality because it really is a likeness (εἰκων ὄντως) (b11). The 
Stranger asks: 
 
So it is not really what is (οὐκ ὄν ἄρα [οὐκ] ὄντως ἐστὶν) but it really is what 
we call a likeness (ὄντως ἣν λέγομεν εἰκόνα)? (b12-13) 
 
This is Plato’s innovative ontological solution to the problem of not being. 
Theaetetus’ answer confirms this: 'Maybe that which is not is woven together with 
that which is' (c1-2). Therefore, a copy neither is what really is nor is not-being but 
only is what in a way is. Thanks to the ontological status of a copy, the third status 
intermediate between being and not being is brought forth. The essence of an image, 
in Kohnke’s words, does not consist 'solely in the negation of what is genuine and 
has real being' because otherwise 'it would be an ὄντως οὐκ ὄν,essentially and 
really a not being' (1957, 37). The characteristics of a copy can be summed up as 
folows: 
i) A copy is a copy by referring to a true thing (πρὸς τἀληθινὸν). 
ii) A copy is different from that of which it is a copy (ἕτερον). 
iii) A copy is not itself a true thing (ἀληθινο ́ν) as that of which it is a copy but only 
that which is like it (ἐοικὸς). 
iv) It is not really that which really is (ὄντως ὄν) but only really a likeness (εἰκων 
ὄντως).  
The conclusion is that: 
v) A copy in a way (πως) is that means it both is and in not, the product of 
interweaving being with not being. 
This leads to the refutation of father Parmenides’ principle, accepting that 'that 
which is not somehow is (τό τε μὴ ὄν ὡς ἔστι)' and 'that which is, somehow is not 
(τό ὄν ὡς οὐκ ἔστι) (241d5-7). Besides copies and likenesses (εἰκόνων), we have 
also imitations (μιμημάτων) and appearances (φαντασμάτων) as the subjects of 
this new kind of being and thus false belief (241e3). 
In Timaeus, the world of becoming which cannot correctly be called and thus 
we have to call it "what is such" (τὸ τοιου ̑τον) (49e5) or "what is altogether such" 
(τὸ διἀ παντὸς τοιου ̑τον) (e6-7), consists solely of imitations (μιμημάτα) (50c5) 
which are identifiable only by the things that they are their imitations. The word 
τοιου ̑τον which had been used to determine the situation of a copy in respect of its 
original, now becomes the definition of the world of becoming in which everything 
is an image of another thing, a Being, that stays always the same and is different and 
separated from its image.
26
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Cherniss, in my view rightly, draws attention to the very important point about 
the ontological status of an image that can at the same time be considered a criticism 
of the relational theory. What we are being said in Timaeus, he thinks,cannot be 
explained by saying that an image is not self-related and making its being relational. 
What is crucial about an image is that it 'stands for something, refers to something, 
means something and this meaning the image has not independently as its own but 
only in reference to something else apart from it' (1998, 296). This function finds its 
best explanation in the theory we are to suggest in the following. 
 
3. πολλαχῶς ἔστι 
The best way to understand the ontological status of an image in Plato is to see 
first how his most clever pupil, Aristotle, resolved the same problem that Plato 
brought his theory of image for its sake. Aristotle’s theory of pollachos legetai is a 
brilliant and, at the same time, deviated version of Plato’s theory that is able, 
however, to help us read Plato in a better way. We discuss Aristotle’s theory to reach 
to a full understanding of Plato’s theory because it is, firstly, constructed in Aristotle 
in a more clear way and, secondly, it can also be taken as an evidence that our 
reading of Plato is legitimate. The phrase τὸ ὄν πολλαχῶς λέγεται, a so much 
repeated phrase in Aristotle’s works,27 is his resolution for some of the ontological 
problems of his predecessors all treating being as if it has only one sense.
28
 Aristotle 
is right in his criticism of the philosophical tradition specially Heraclitus, Parmenides 
and Plato since all did presuppose only one sense for being and his theory is, thus, a 
creative and revolutionary solution for many problems that all the past philosophers 
were stuck in. But it is at the same time somehow a borrowed theory. As we will 
discuss, both the structure of the doctrine and the problems it tries to resolve are the 
same as Plato’s doctrine (and even is comparable in its phraseology) though it is in 
Aristotle, as can be expected, a more clear and better structured doctrine.  
1) Associated with the theory of pros hen and the theory of substance, the theory of 
several senses of being provides a structure which, I insist, is the best guide to 
understand Plato’s theory of Being in Sophist, Timeaus and Republic.  
a) Although the theory of pollachos legetai is not necessarily based on the theory of 
pros hen, they become tightly interdependent about being: 
 
Being is said in many ways/senses (τὸ δὲ ὄν λέγεται μὲν πολλαχῶς) but by 
reference to one (πρὸς ἕν) [way/sense] and one kind of nature (μίαν τινὰ 
φύσιν).29 (Metaphysics 1003a33-34) 
 
The doctrine of pros hen which is Aristotle’s initiative third alternative besides 
the homonymous and synonymous application of words, is primarily a linguistic 
theory that tries to provide a new theory to explain the different implementations of 
the same word. The pros hen implementation of being is to provide an alternative for 
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the theory of the synonymous (in Plato: homonymous) implementation of being 
which says being is said in one sense (kath hen) (1060b 32-33). That both the pros 
hen and the kath hen implementation of a word has one thing (hen) as what is 
common, makes them in opposition to the homonymous implementation which does 
not consider anything in common. Whereas both pros hen and kath hen assume a 
common nature, with which all the implementations of the word have some kind of 
relation, their difference is that while kath hen takes all the implementations of the 
word as the same with the common nature, pros hen makes them different. Substance 
is called πρῶτον ὄν because it is said to be primarily:  
 
For as is (τὸ ἔστιν) is predicated of all things, not however in the same way 
(οὐχ ὁμοίως) but of one sort of thing primarily and of others in a secondary 
way.  So too τὸτί ἐστιν belongs simply (ἁπλῶς) to substance but in a limited 
sense (πῶς) to the others [other categories] (1030a21-23). 
 
The word ἁπλῶς standing against κατὰ συμβεβηκός tries to make 
substance different from the accidents. When we are being said that τὸ ὄν 
πολλαχῶς λέγεται, it means that only the substance that is simply (ἁπλῶς) the 
ἕν, the common nature, τὸὄν. When we use the word 'being' about a substance, the 
being is said differently from when we use 'being' about an accident.  
The distinction between the substance and the other categories is a distinction 
between what simply is said to be and what only with reference to (pros) the 
substance is said to be. The doctrine of pros hen, changing kath hen to pros hen in 
respect of to on, makes a distinction that wants to show that while there is a kind of 
implementing the word being that is simply being, there is another kind which is 
called being only by reference to that which is simply being. In the doctrine of pros 
hen it is not so that all the things that are said to be are only by reference to a 
common one thing, but that while one thing is called being because it is that thing 
itself, the other things are called so without being that thing itself but only by 
referring to it. At the very beginning of book Γ, it is said that: 
 
Being is said in many senses but all refer to one arche. Some things are said to 
be because they are substances, others because they are affections of substances, 
others because they are a process towards substances or destructions or 
privations or qualities of substances … (1003b5-9, cf. 1028a18-20)30 
 
Substance is what really is said to be and all other things that are said to be are 
said only in favor of it. This difference of substance from all other senses of being is 
what is, I believe, primarily aimed in Aristotle’s interrelated theories of pollachos 
legetai,pros hen and the theory of substance.  
b) The difference of the implementation of being in the case of substance and the 
accidents goes so deep that while substance is considered as the real being, the 
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accidents are almost not being. An accident is a mere name (Metaphysics 1026b13-
14) and is obviously akin to not being (b21). Aristotle adds that Plato was 'in a sense 
not wrong' saying that sophists deal with not being (τὸ μὴ ὄν) because the 
arguments of sophists are, above all, about the accidental (1026b13-16). At the 
beginning of book , he says about quality and quantity (which look to be more of a 
being than other accidents) that they are not existent (οὐδ̕ ὄντα ὡς εἰπεῖν) in an 
unqualified sense (ἁπλῶς) (1069a21-22). 
The two above-mentioned points, Aristotle’s (a) interwoven theories of 
pollachos legetai, pros hen and the theory of substance and (b) taking accidents 
almost as not being, comparedwith substance, brings forth a structure that I shall call 
Pollachos Legetai (with capital first letters). What is of the highest importance in this 
structure for me is the difference of substance from accidents and the kind of relation 
which is settled between them. There is a substance that without any qualification is 
said to be and the accidents that are said to be only by reference (pros) to it. Adding 
Aristotle’s point about accidents that they are nearly not being to this relation and 
difference, we can obviously see how much this structure is close to Plato’s original-
copy ontology. We spoke of the relation of being and difference in Plato’s model and 
the way Plato construes the being of a copy. A copy is a copy only by referring to 
(pros) a model; it is different from (ἕτερον) that of which it is a copy; it is not itself 
a true thing as its model and not really that which is (ὄντως ὄν) but only is in a way 
(πῶς). If we behold the difference of substance and accident in the context of the 
theory of pollachos legetai and pros hen, we can observe its fundamental similarity 
with Plato’s original-copy theory in its structure.31 
Allen draws attention to the fact that the relation between Forms and 
particulars in Plato’s original-copy model is 'something intermediate between 
univocity and full equivocity' (1998, 70, n. 24) and the same as what Aristotle calls it 
pros hen (ibid). What made us compare the two structures was not, of course, the 
complete similarity of two structures (we have to agree with many possible 
differences of the two theories) but exactly the specific relation between an original 
and its copy on the one hand, and a substance and its accident on the other hand. As 
substance and accident do not share a common character and the substance -accident 
model hints that they stand in a certain relation, there is no common character 
between the original and copy in Plato’s model as well.  
Furthermore, their similarity is not confined to their structure only; they are 
also aimed to solve the same problem. The central point of the theory is that all the 
predecessors took being in one sense and this was their weakness point. Besides the 
mentioned above passages about the relation of pollachos legetai and presocratics’, 
as well as Plato’s, ontology, the relation of the theory with the problem of not being 
is clear in several passages. In Metaphysics, it is said: 'Being is then said in many 
senses… It is for this reason that we say even of not being that it is not being' 
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(1003b5-10). Discussing the accidental sense of being, Aristotle points that it is in 
the accidental way that we say, for example, that not-white is because that of which it 
is an accident is (1017a18-19, cf. 1069a22-24). We mentioned that he thought Plato 
was right saying that sophistic deals with not being because sophistic deals with 
accidental, which is somehow not being (1026b14-16). Plato turned sophistic not-
being to what both is and is not and Aristotle to what accidentally is said to be. What 
helps Aristotle to resolve the problem of not being is his distinction between ἁπλῶς 
and κατὰ σθμβεβηκός. Aristotle’s "qua" (ᾕ) which is directly linked with his 
distinction between καθ’ αὑτο λέγεται and κατὰ συμβεβηκός λέγεται, is used 
to resolve the old problem of coming to be out of not being (Physics 191b4-10). He 
strictly asserts that his predecessors could not solve the problem because they failed 
to observe the distinction of "qua itself" from "qua another thing" (b10-13). He then 
continues: 
 
We ourselves are in agreement with them in holding that nothing can be said 
simply (ἁπλως) to come from not being (μὴὄντος). But nevertheless we 
maintain that a thing may come to be from not being in an accidental way (κατὰ 
συμβεβηκός). For from privation which ὅ ἐστι καθ’ αὑτο μὴ ὄν, nothing can 
become.
32
 (Phy. 191b13-16, cf. b19-25)  
 
Our use of Aristotle’s theory as a prelude to explain Plato’s ontology does not 
intend to claim that their solutions are the same but only that they have the same 
structure with almost the same parts. There is still, among many possible differences, 
a fundamental difference between two theories: whereas Plato tries to solve the 
problem of Parmenidean being and not being by refusing Parmenides’ being through 
a new kind of being that both is and is not, Aristotle resolves the problem from a 
different point of view. His solution does not need a third ontological status besides 
being and not being including things that both are and are not because he is still in a 
Parmenidean position: 'We do not subvert the principle that everything either is or is 
not' (Physics 191b26-27). Aristotle’ criticism of those who bring the indefinite dyad 
besides one, can be admissibly accepted as a reference to Plato and the Academy. 
Their problem, from Aristotle’s point of view, was that they framed the difficulty in 
an old-fashioned way based on Parmenides’ saying that it is impossible for not being 
to be (Metaphysics 1089a4). They are under Aristotle’s criticism not because they 
kept Parmenides’ principle but because they thought they have to resolve the 
problem by rejecting it: 'they thought it necessary to prove that which is not is' 
(1089a5, cf. a19). This undoubtedly refers to Sophist where Plato rejects the 
principle. Aristotle’s solution is different from Plato in this very point. He does not 
think that the problem must be solved in an old-fashioned way trying to refuse 
Parmenidean being but by Pallachus Legetai without needing to present a third 
ontological status. Have I been able to show that Aristotle’s Pollachos Legetai is 
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comparable with Plato’s solution; I call his solution Pollachos Esti.33 What this 
changing of legetai to esti is intended to show is not the change of a linguistic to an 
ontological theory since not only the former’s being linguistic is not to be claimed 
here
34
 but we are not going to claim that the latter’s theory is ontological in a merely 
existential sense.  
Therefore, before Aristotle’s theory of different senses of being as the solution 
of his predecessors’ ontological problem, Plato had resolved the problem by a 
thoroughly different version of what Aristotle used later. His solution is based on the 
notion of difference: things that are something (F), are so in different ways. Suppose 
that we have three things, 1) Φ as the Form, 2) φ as one of the particulars and 3) f as 
the shadow of that particular, all are called by the same name, F.  All of these three 
things are thus F. Not only the Form of the beautiful (Φ) is beautiful (F) but also one 
particular beautiful (φ) as well as its shadow (f).35 The point is that while they all are 
beautiful (F), they are not so in the same way. The way in which f, the shadow of φ is 
F is different from the way in which φ is F as well as both of them are F in different 
ways from Φ, the form of F. The Form of beautiful, a beautiful flower and its image 
in a mirror all are beautiful but not in the same way. Let’s consider the following 
statements:  
i) The Form of the beautiful IS beautiful. 
ii) A flower Is beautiful. 
iii) Its image is beautiful. 
I used atypically three forms of the verb 'is' to show where the difference is 
relied on. We do not apply the 'is' in these sentences in the same way which is to 
mean that this 'is' is not the same in them.
36
 While ΦIS F, φIs F and f only is F. These 
differences in the shape of the verb are supposed to imply that the difference is in 
being. All the things which are one thing, are so differently because their being F is 
not the same in them. Therefore, difference is extended to all the cases in which it is 
said that each of them '… esti X'. It is absurd then to think, as from Aristotle onward 
we are used to, that when we say about different things that each of them 'is' 
something, X, all of them are that thing in the same way.As Allen says, the function 
"… is X" is 'systematically ambiguous' (1998, 62). Based on Aristotelian 
understanding of universal, there is no difference in the way of using 'is' in all the 
cases of a universal when it is said that each of them 'is' that universal. Though 
maybe not explicitly stated, it is indeed in the basis of the definition of a universal to 
be applicable to its cases in the same way. Based on this view, no difference is 
allowed in 'is' between two sentences of 'man is animal' and 'horse is animal'. Each of 
them 'is' animal in the same way. This is what Plato’s new theory of Pollachos Esti 
intends to change. I think Plato’s new model of original-copy is theorized to provide 
an explanation how this can happen. Both the original and its copy are the same 
things, but they differ in their way of being that thing. While both Socrates and his 
reflex in water is Socrates, they are so in different ways, that is, by different ways of 
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being Socrates. Any reduction of this difference to degrees or levels or anything like 
this does not, therefore, state Plato’s theory in its full and correct sense.37 
In Plato’s theory, thus, all things which are one thing are (not: are called as in 
Aristotle) so (a) not in the same way but in different ways and (b) by reference to 
(pros) the Form of that thing. All things that are, for instance, beautiful, are so in 
different ways and by reference to the Form of the beautiful. When Plato says then 
that the object of knowledge is what purely is (ει ̓λικρινῶς ὄντος) (478d6-7) but the 
object of opinion which both is and is not ου ̓δέτερον εἰλικρινὲς ο ̓ρθω̑ς α ̓́ν 
προσαγορευόμενον (478e2-3), what is intended is their difference in their being. 
Φ, the Form of F, φ, a particular F and f, an image of F, are differently F. This is 
applying difference and plurality not to the simple and absolute being but to being a 
certain thing. What Plato discovers here, which I think can be observed as his most 
innovative ontological discovery, is, if we are allowed to use Aristotle’s phraseology, 
finding difference and plurality in universality and the way each case of a universal 
is that universal. The concept of F which was a universal concept equally applicable 
to its instances, is now broken by difference to different ways of being F. This 
ontology seems to extend pluralism to its boundaries.
38
 Not only is the difference of 
different things presupposed here, it expands the sphere of differentiation to the 
difference of the same things: even the things that are the same thing, F, differ from 
each other in their very being F.  
Vlastos is right that Plato does not say that the objects that the lovers of sights 
and sounds love, do not exist or only half exist (1998, 223) but it does not mean that 
Plato, as he thinks, wants their reality to be the case. What is neglected by both 
Vlastos’ theory of degrees of reality and Allen and others’ theory of particulars as 
relational entities is Plato’s theory of "difference in being". The theory of degrees of 
reality may be successful in escaping degrees of existence but not only goes far from 
the ontological aspect of Plato’s solution but also neglects the notion of difference. 
The relational theory, on the other hand, while does not focus sufficiently on 
difference as the basis of Plato’s theory has an excessive stress on the relational 
character of a copy in the original-copy model. 
 
Conclusion 
As we could say in Aristotle that only substance can really be called 'being' and 
all the accidents are called so only in favor of, and referring to, substance;it is right,in 
Plato’s philosophy, to say that only Φ, the Form, really is F (IS F) and all the φs as 
well as all fs are F only in favor of, and referring to,Φ. How should we interpret this 
'is'? existential, predicative or veridical? This '… is', first, should not be understood 
in an absolute and simple way but as being of something and as '…is X'. This means 
that it cannot, at least at the first sight, be simply applied to existence. I say 'at the 
first sight' because we cannot see Plato concerned with the simply existential use of 
'is' when it is meant by it only that something exists. Nevertheless, we cannot say that 
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it is free from any existential sense because he has not excluded it from 'is X'. 
Although it is right that when it is said that something 'is X' it does not mean directly 
that it exists, it seems that it also implies the existence in Plato. Besides Plato’s way 
of treating with the problem of false belief as an evidence of this, the fact that neither 
Plato nor Aristotle distinguished the existential 'is' even when it is expected, for 
example in Aristotle when he distinguished the different senses of being, shows that 
we have to consider it as attached to other used of the verb.  
Regarding the other senses of being like predicative and veridical sense, it can 
be said that in spite of the fact that Plato does not distinguish between these senses, 
Pollachos Esti applies difference to both of these senses of 'is'. Having some kind of 
existential sense in itself, the 'is' can thus be considered propositional, predicative 
and veridical at the same time but neither of them alone. The simultaneous being and 
not being of a particular, φ, which is F, but, at the same time, is not F, will be 
explained in this way: the predicate of F can be predicated on φ but it cannot be 
predicated at the same time because while φ Is F, it IS not F if we remind that only 
Φ, the Form of F, IS F. The F-ness of φ is true about it because it Is F, but it is false 
at the same time because it IS not F. The same can be said about TW. It does not 
matter whether we consider two worlds or one (cf. Perl, 1999, 351) only if we have 
in mind that the relation of them must be kept as the relation which is explained in 
the allegories of Sun, Cave and Line. Being the closest theory to the suggestion of 
this paper, Allen’s explanation of Plato’s theory is not yet Pollachos Esti. His 
interpretation, however, gets to almost the same point: 
 
Though you may call the reflection of a red scarf red if you so please, you 
cannot mean the same thing you mean when you call its original red 
(1998, 62). (my Italic) 
 
Plato’s use of the phrases παντελῶς ὄν(477a2) εἰλικρινῶς ὄντος(477a7, 
478d6-7) and τοῦ ὄντος εἰλικρινῶς(479d5) in Republic should be read as making 
qualifications on being. Any effort to reduce Plato’s being in Republic to existential, 
veridical or predicative senses is anachronistic because these distinctions are mostly 
based on either modern ontology or Aristotle’s distinction which Plato never made. 
This is obvious even from Aristotle’s criticism that Plato tried to resolve the 
difficulty in an old-fashioned way trying to reject Parmenides. The theory of 
Pollachos Esti can be understood only on the basis of the absence of pollachos 
legetai and the theory of pollachos legetai when it is criticizing Plato, as we saw, can 
be understood only based on the fact that Plato, in Aristotle’s point of view, does not 
make distinctions in the senses of being.  
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Notes 
                                                 
1
One may say, like Bolton, that Plato’s paradoxical phrase must be taken literally. 'All that 
Plato means to claim in Republic V', he says, 'is that beautiful sensible objects are not 
unqualifiedly beautiful' (1998, 124). 
2
 As Annas notes, this disjunction of the objects of knowledge and opinion, is the most 
controversial among Platonic theories because it puts the philosopher in a 'different 
cognitive world' (1981, 193). 
3
 Plato’s elaborate discussion of being in Sophist, besides Republic, provided the required 
ground for many (e.g., Gosling, 1973, 214; Brown, 1986, 68-69; Ackrill, 1957, 1-6; 
Bostock, 1984, 89-119; Owen 1971, 223-67; Runciman, 1962, 89-90; Cornford, 1935, 
296; Grombie, 1963, 499) to find some evidences of some kind of distinction either 
between complete and incomplete senses of the verb or the 'is' of identity and the 'is' of 
predication or … Challenging the distinction of the identity from predicative use of the 
verb, Crivelli (2012, 154-157) suggests that Plato is making the distinction between the 
different senses of the verb in its incomplete senset. As we will discuss, I prefer Jean 
Roberts’ idea that Sophist can 'in no useful way' be described as a distinguishing of 
different senses of being (1998, 142). Vlastos thinks that while Plato’s use of being in 
Sophist (regarding ordinary and Paulin predication) is ambiguous, he is himself unaware 
of the ambiguity (1973, 270-308). 
4One problem with Fine’s veridical reading is that it cannot be compatible with texts which 
are more suggestive of objects. As Gonzalez points out (1996, 262), Fine’s veridical 
reading means that when Plato says at 476e-477a that knowledge is of something (τί), he 
is suggesting that only true propositions are something and also the passage at 478b-c 
must entail that false propositions are nothing. The impossibility of believing what is not 
must imply, in Fine’s veridical reading, that it is impossible to believe what is false or 
absolutely false. Fine tries to solve this last problem with the distinction of false and 
'totally false' or 'very false' belief (2003, 76). Fine’s answer to the problem of the meaning 
of both being true and not true about belief is that it is 'partly true and partly false, or near 
the mark' (ibid, 70). Fine's claim that her veridical reading has its own privilege and 
makes the argument’s conclusion more attractive is challenged by Annas since it leads to 
degrees of truth which does not make any more sense than that of degrees of existence 
(1981, 198). 
5
 To escape TW, Fine tries to reduce the difference to contents and not objects. The 
prisoners’ inferior level of knowledge, she says, is not because they see the images of 
physical objects and not the objects themselves but because 'they cannot systematically 
discriminate between images and the objects they are of'. (1998, 248)  
6
The opposition of the same and difference can be seen in his famous words that 'on those 
stepping into rivers staying the same (τοῖσιν αὐτοῖσιν) different and different (ἕτερα 
καὶ ἕτερα) water flow' (Diels-Kranz (DK), Fr.39). The result is, for Heraclitus, a 
paradox: 'into the same river we step and do not step, we are and are not (εἶμέν τε καὶ 
οὐκ εἶμέν) (Graham (2010), F. 65). 
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7
He asserts again and again that only being is and it is impossible for not being to be (DK, 
Fr.2.3, 5-6, 4.2, 6.1-2, 7.1, 8.2) and not being is unthinkable and unsayable (DK, Fr. 2.7-
8, 3, 8.8-9) and it is all the same (ξυνὸν) (DK, Fr. 5.1). 
8Though I used Cooper’s (ed.) translation (1997) for Plato’s texts, I was not totally commited 
to it and changed it based on the Greek text wherever a more strict translation was 
needed. 
9
Dancy (1991, 97) correctly points to Sophist 244b-245e as having the same echo. 
10
 At 259a5-6, both being and difference are said as what pervade all and each other. 
11
Also cf. Hintikka (1973, 26): 'precisely a replacement of the idea of not-being by that of 
difference'. 
12
 Frede’s statement that 'Plato does not identify being with difference but with a particular 
Form or kind of difference' (1992, 408) is misleading. Plato does not take being as 
difference nor as the Form of difference. Being and difference are separated from each 
other but share in each other. Plato interprets being by difference but he does not identify 
being neither with it norwith a particular kind of it. 
13
 The word in use is φθεγγόμεθα. Kostman (1973, 198) suggests reading it 'is predicated' 
instead of 'is called'. We preferred, however, to use the less technical word 'is called' for 
the simple reason that it does not seem to be applied in a different sense than its normal 
use.      
14
Kostman (1973, 198) takes this sentence as an evidence of rejecting the standard view (cf. 
Ross (1951, 115), Owen (1971, 238-240)) of reading  ἕτερον, based on which it means 
'non-identical'. The fact that Plato makes not-beautiful different from nothing but (οὐκ 
ἄλλου τινὸς) the nature of beautiful shows that we cannot translate it simply to 'non-
identical'. It is actually non-identical with every other thing, but it is ἕτερον only from 
the nature of beautiful. Nonetheless, I cannot understand how this passage can be 
consistent with Kostman’s own translation of it as 'incompatible' (1973, 205-206). As I 
wish this paper show, the only acceptable interpretation of the word that can be applicable 
to all the passages, at least in Sophist, is what will be suggested in this paper as pollachos 
esti. 
15
Some scholarsmake their endeavor to resolve the contradictories of Plato’s explanation of 
not-being by distinguishing between different senses of it, which, I think, might be of any 
assistance to the problem. Lewis (1977), for instance, considers an 'essential' dichotomy 
between the treatment of not-being in contexts of non-identity versus in contexts of NP 
proper.  
16Cornford’s (1935, 295 n.2) distinction of two statements seems unnecessary. He 
distinguishes between two, i) that the difference is not the same as Being, but still is 
existent and ii) that the different is not a thing that is (viz. a certain existent) but is a thing 
that is. The second dilemma seems indeed to be a wrong one. It is not said that difference 
is not a certain existent. Its existence is,actually, what it insists on when it is said that the 
difference is.  
17
Tanner (2010, 94) notes that the translation of paradigm to original is problematic. The 
sense of pattern and example of paradigm is not implied enough by original.   
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18
Words like παντελῶς ὄν (477a), τοῦ εἰλικρινῶς ὄντος (477a, 478d, 479d), τελέως ὄν 
(597a), κλίνης ὄντως οὔσης (597d), μα̑λλον ὄντα (515d), μα̑λλον ὄντων (585d). 
What I think on the case is that Plato’s epithets like παντελῶς or μα̑λλον, capable 
enough to be taken as hinting to degree must be interpreted, as Cooper points out, based 
on the fact that Plato’s theory of being 'is so difficult to express without straining 
language to its limits' (1986, 242). 
19
 He also refers to: εἰλικρινές at Sym. 211e, τὸ ὄν ὄντως at Phil. 59d, οὐσία ὄντως 
οὔσα at Phds. 247c, ὄντως οὐδέποτε ὄν at Tim. 28a 
20Vlastos agrees that his doctrine is 'a lucid consequence of Plato’s epistemology' (1998, 
229). 
21
 From another point of view, asCynthia Hampton (1998, 240) points, though the 
ontological and epistemological senses of reality might be distinguished, the epistemic 
sense ultimately depends on the ontological sense.  
22
Actually, Vlastos himself opposes his view of degrees of reality that is 'a difference in 
degree between beings of the same kind' to what will somehow be our solution to the 
problem namely, 'a difference in kind between different kinds of being'. (1954, 340) What 
Allen says (1998, 63) is somehow the same. 
23
White (1977, 200) insists on the fact that there is no mention of εἰκόνες, ὁμοιώματα or 
μιμήματα for particulars in Phaedo. He also (ibid, 201) denies the use of εἶδωλα at 
Sym. 212 as a reference to the reflection theory (1977, 201). 
24Scolnicov’s claim (2003, 65) about an ontological difference between paradigm and what 
resembles it in Parmenides 132-133 has no textual evidence to rely on and the word he 
mentions, εἰκασθη̑ναι, is not enough. Nonetheless, I believe that the ontological 
difference of a paradigm and its image is a developed version of the simple resemblance 
theory to which Plato was committed in Parmenides. Contrary to those like Runciman 
who think that 'asymmetrical resemblance is a contradiction in terms' (1959, 158), 
itseems not only possible but also the ground of one of the differences of Plato’s theory of 
paradigm with his previous theory of resemblance. That Plato's theory in Parmenides was 
not based on the non-reciprocal relation is obvious from Coxon’s note. Referring to some 
texts including Parmenides 139e and 140b, Coxon (1999, 110) points that the fact that 
Plato brings τὸ ταὐτὸν πεπονθός as the definition of "the like" shows that the concept 
of a non-reciprocal likeness was unknown to Parmenides of Parmenides besides the 
historical Parmenides. 
25
This is not claimed only here in this paper. Cf. Palmer, 1999, 144 
26
The explanation of the being of a copy and its difference with its original can be seen at 
52c2-d1: 
 
Since that for which an image has come to be is not at all intrinsic to the 
image, which is invariably appearance of something different (ἑτερουδέ 
τινος), it stands to reason that the image should therefore come to be in 
something else (ἐν ἑτέρῳ … τινὶ), somehow clinging to being (οὐσίας 
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ἁμωσγέπως ἀντεχομένην) or else be nothing at all (ἢ μηδὲν τὸ 
παράπαν αὐτὴν). But that which really is (ὄντως ὄντι) receives support 
from the accurate true account -that as long as the one is distinct from the 
other, neither of them ever comes to be in the other in such a way that they at 
the same time become one and the same, and also two. 
 
As far as it is related to our discussion, this passage aims to demonstrate that the 
copy must be different from its original, but it must, at the same time, be kind of 
being though it cannot be a real being as its original is. 
27
E.g., Met.: 1003a33, b5, 1018a35-36, 1026a33-34, b2, 1028a10, 13-14 (τοσαυταχῶς … 
ὄντος), 1030a17-18 (τὸ τί ἐστι πλεοναχῶς λέγεται), a21 (τὸ ἔστιν ὑπάρχει πα̃σιν 
ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὁμοίως), 1042b25-26 (τὸ ἔστι τοσαυταχῶς λέγεται), 1060b32-33, 
1089a7, Phy.: 185a21, b6, 206a21 (πολλαχως τὸ εἴναι)  
28
At Metaphysics 992b18-19, Aristotle criticizes Presocratics asserting: 'if we inquire the 
elements of existing things without distinguishing the various senses in which things are 
said (πολλαχῶς λεγομένον) to be, we cannot succeed'. In Physics, he criticizes 
Lycophron and his associates in the idea that the word 'is' must be omitted because they 
thought 'as if one or being are said in one sense (ὡς μοναχῶς λεγομένου τοῦ ἑνος ἢ 
τοῦ ὄντος)' (185b31-32). His attack to Parmenides (Phy. 186a22 ff.) is based on the 
same ground. Parmenides’ assumption that being is said without qualification (ἁπλῶς 
λαμβάνει τὸ ὄν λέγεσθαι) is false because it is said in several senses (λεγομένου 
πολλαχῶς) (186a24-25). Parmenides’ hypothesis that 'being means [only] one thing (τὸ 
ὄν σημαίνειν ἕν)' (186b4) is the basis of his problems (186a32-b3) and if we analyze 
his theory correctly, as Aristotle himself does (b4-12), it follows that being must have 
more than one meaning (b12). 
29I used Barnes’ translation (1991) for Aristotle’s texts, but I was not totally commited to it 
and changed it based on the Greek text wherever a more strict translation was needed. 
30
See also at the beginning of Z (1028a10-13). 
31
Cornford notes that Aristotle must have learnt his pollachos legetai from Parmenedes II 
and its countless discussions (1939, 110-111). The view that Aristotle’s theory of 
categories developed as a result of his reflection on TM as suggested by some 
commentators like Vlastos (1954, 335) and Owen (1975) is not far from our comparison 
because I think Plato’s theory of original-shadow is itself developed because of TM. 
Aristotle’s theory might then be observed as a result of his reflection on Plato’s original-
copy model which was Plato’s own solution to TM. 
32Aristotle’s solution for the paradox of Meno by distinguishing two senses is also 
noteworthy (P. An. 71a29-b8). 
33
Though this phrase we chose as the name of Plato’s theory is based on Aristotle’s phrase, it 
had been used somehow by Plato himself. In the previously mentioned passage about the 
relation of being and difference in Sophist (259a-b) we have Stranger saying: 
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Being (τὸ ὄν) has a share in the difference, so, being different from all of the 
others, it is not each of them and is not all of the others except itself. So 
being (τὸ ὄν) indisputably is not millions of things and both is in many ways 
(πολλαχῇ μὴν ἔστι) each and all of them and is not in many ways 
(πολλαχῇ δ’οὐκ ἔστιν) [each and all of them] (259b1-6). 
At 256e5-6 we are told that: 
περὶ ἕκαστον ἄρα τῶν εἰδῶν πολὺ μέν ἐστι τὸ ὄν, ἄπειρονπλήθειδὲ τὸ  μ
ὴ ὄν. 
And at 263b11-12: 
πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔφαμενὄντα περὶ ἕκαστον εἶναί που, πολλὰ δὲ οὐκ 
  ὄντα. 
34
 Nonetheless, it is not wrong to say that Aristotle deals with the issue more from an 
epistemological point of view or at least not from a view as ontological as Plato’s. That 
either Aristotle’s Pollachos Legetai is linguistic (cf. Saches 1948. Ackrill (1963, 75f.) 
argues against linguistic reading), logical (cf. Kung 1999, 199-200)or ontological (cf. 
Fine 2003, 345), is out of the boundaries of this paper. What my short analysis can imply 
is only that the difficulty of Parmenidean being and not being is to be resolved by 
Pollachos Legetai from an epistemological point of view. I do not say linguistic because 
it has its own entailments. Logical may be the best word, but nowadays’ understanding of 
it might be misleading. We can be sure, however, that Aristotle’s analysis from an 
epistemological point of view does not mean for him a non ontological attitude: 
 
It is not because we think truly that you are white that you are white, but because 
you are white we who say that are saying the truth (Metaphysics 1051b6-9) 
35Though Allen agrees that based on "the logic of Plato’s metaphor" the picture of, for 
example, a hand is a hand, he thinks it is absurd because the picture only resembles that 
of which it is the picture, but it cannot itself be that: 'it is clearly false that reflection [of a 
scarf] is a scarf'. He concludes then, using Aristotle’s language, that we must distinguish 
between substantial and accidental resemblances (1998, 61-2). While I draw the attention 
to his connection of Plato’s theory and Aristotle’s theory of substance-accident, I think he 
can be misleading in the central point. All Plato’s theory is to fulfill is the explanation of 
this: how can both a Form and its participant or an original and its copy be the same 
thing? The theory of Pollachos Esti has this explanation as its aim. It wants to explain 
how a hand and its picture can both be hands. The solution the theory brings forth is that 
though they both are hands, they are so in different ways. This is exactly what Allen 
himself points to (ibid, 62). Therefore, if we say that the picture of a hand is not a hand, 
we are far from understanding both Plato’s problem and his solution.  
36
As Nehamas points out, when we say that particulars are only imperfectly F in comparison 
to the Form of F-ness, the imperfection belongs to the "being" rather than to the "F" in 
"being F". (1998, 79) 
37
 Gonzalez’ idea (1996, 261) is noteworthy: 
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To be fully F is to exist fully. On this view, what is absurd is not the notion 
of degrees of existence but the modern notion that a sensible object can be 
imperfectly beautiful and yet perfectly exist, that its beauty and existence can 
be kept so distinct that the imperfection of the one does not affect the other.  
38Plato’s remedy for this radical plurality includes i) his theory of Forms which tries to bind 
these different things and ii) his theory of the Good = One that is the binding bind of all 
things. The theory of difference breaks being more than ever to different parts, but it does 
not make problem for Plato because being is not anymore the guardian of unity. The 
relation of being and one is ruptured at least in Republic since the duty of unifying is 
given to the One which is the Good and not the being but beyond being and superior to it 
(Republic 509b).  
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